

# Insider threats — when the risk is already inside

Not every insider is malicious — most insider incidents are caused by negligence. We distinguish deliberate, negligent, and compromised insiders and show how cultural and technical measures work together.

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## What are insider threats?

**Insider threats** arise from people who have legitimate access to systems, data, or buildings — and who use that access in an abusive way, whether deliberately or not. The term covers three fundamentally different profiles:

**Deliberate insiders** act with malicious intent: they steal customer data before moving to a competitor, sabotage systems out of frustration, or sell access credentials to external attackers. These cases are dramatic but comparatively rare.

**Negligent insiders** are statistically more common: employees who send sensitive data to the wrong email address, lose a USB stick, use shadow IT services without checking them, or fall for a phishing email. There is no malicious intent — but the damage is real.

**Compromised insiders** often do not know they have become a tool: their credentials were stolen, their device infected with malware, or they were manipulated through social engineering into unwitting cooperation.

## At a glance

01

### Negligence is the dominant cause

In most insider incidents there is no criminal intent. Inadequate training, process gaps, and time pressure are more common causes than malice.

02

### Insiders bypass the technical perimeter

An employee who is legitimately allowed to download data triggers no alert rules — even if they copy mass quantities shortly before resigning.

03

### Early indicators are often cultural

Unusual behaviour, social withdrawal, expressed frustration, or noticeable loyalty shifts often precede insider incidents by weeks.

## How to recognise insider threats

**Unusual data download**

Mass downloads of customer data, contract documents, or IP — especially outside working hours or shortly before resignation or departure.

**Access outside own role**

A sales employee accesses development repositories; a support worker opens HR files. Unusual access patterns are early warning signals.

**New privilege escalation**

Accounts that suddenly acquire higher rights or submit access requests outside normal processes.

**"Covering" for a colleague**

Other employees helping someone explain or conceal their behaviour — can indicate deliberate collusion or social pressure.

**Abrupt loyalty shifts**

Suddenly negative attitude towards the organisation, mention of competitor offers, conspicuously new interest in sensitive areas.

**USB use on locked-down systems**

Attempts to move data through unauthorised routes (USB, personal cloud accounts, screenshots).

## How to protect yourself

### For employees

- **Report unusual behaviour** — even when it concerns a trusted colleague. Speak-up channels exist precisely for situations like this.
- **Do not share credentials**, even within the team. Every employee should use their own account.
- **Use data only for legitimate purposes:** Customer or product data should be handed back — not taken — at the end of a project or upon departure.
- **Report shadow IT tools** rather than simply using them. IT departments can often provide fast solutions once the need is known.

### For administrators

- **Apply least privilege consistently:** Restrict access rights to the minimum required for the role; conduct regular recertification.
- **Sharpen the offboarding process:** Revoke access on the last working day (not after), collect equipment, deactivate cloud accounts.
- **User and Entity Behaviour Analytics (UEBA):** Detect deviations from baselines (mass download, night-time access, unusual devices).
- **Data Loss Prevention (DLP):** Configure rules for the exfiltration of sensitive data via email, USB, and cloud uploads.
- **Establish a whistleblowing system:** A low-threshold, anonymous reporting channel for colleague behaviour — compliant with applicable whistleblower protection law.

## Real cases

### CASE 01 · SOFTWARE COMPANY · DE · Q2/2025

A developer who felt passed over for a promotion systematically copied source code and customer configurations to personal cloud storage during his final two weeks. He joined a competitor and used the material for a competing product.

**Damage:** trade secret loss, litigation · **Detection:** UEBA alert on mass download three days after resignation

notice · **Lesson:** DLP rules and UEBA could have stopped the exfiltration before it was complete.

**CASE 02 · HOSPITAL · CH · Q4/2025**

An administrative employee used the patient-data access of a retired colleague whose account had accidentally remained active for months. She sold patient profiles to a marketing company.

**Damage:** breach of medical confidentiality, fine, patient litigation · **Detection:** access log analysis by an external auditor · **Lesson:** The offboarding process should have deactivated the account on the last working day. Access reviews would have been a further safety net.

## What to do if it happens?

**THE FIRST 15 MINUTES**

1. **Revoke the affected account's access immediately** — do not wait for consultation; act at once.
2. **No confrontation without HR and legal:** Insider incidents carry employment law consequences that wrong procedure can make expensive.
3. **Forensic preservation** before device access: secure log data, event logs, and storage contents before the device is wiped.
4. **Determine the scope of access:** What was downloaded, when, and where did it go? This determines reporting obligations.
5. **Check GDPR/DSG notification requirements:** For data protection breaches, notification to the supervisory authority may be required within 72 hours.
6. **Consider a criminal complaint** — especially in cases of deliberate trade secret theft.

## Frequently asked questions

**Is monitoring employees legal?**

Within limits and with restrictions. In Germany, the BDSG applies and the works council has co-determination rights. In Switzerland, the DSG applies. Behaviour-based anomaly detection (UEBA) is assessed differently under data protection law than continuous keystroke logging. A works agreement or staff regulations should provide the legal basis.

**What is the difference between a deliberate and a negligent insider?**

Deliberate: conscious intent to harm or self-enrich. Negligent: inattentiveness, process circumvention for convenience, poor judgement without malicious intent. Legally and interpersonally the difference is significant — but the technical countermeasures overlap considerably.

**How do I address insider threats in a small team?**

Through processes (dual control, access minimisation, offboarding checklists) and culture (open communication, psychological safety). Technology alone rarely works at small scale — trust and clear expectations matter more.

## Related topics

Insider threats overlap with ransomware (an external actor using an internal employee as a tool), data leaks through shadow IT, and social engineering (compromised insiders as an entry point), data leaks through shadow IT, and social engineering